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ARKANSAS AND THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE:
SOME ISSUES AND ANSWERS
Richard V. Wellman*
The Uniform Probate Code' (U.P.C.) may be considered by the
Arkansas General Assembly at some future date. Thanks to the
interest and efforts of the organized elderly and other consumer
groups, the U.P.C. was studied carefully by a seventeen member
commission appointed by Former Governor Pryor to formulate rec-
ommendations to the legislature regarding probate law. The Com-
mission's report recommended the enactment of the U.P.C. with
very few changes. However, the proposed Bill based on the U.P.C.
was referred to an interim judiciary committee and thus its future
is uncertain.''
In an effort to add light to the general understanding of the
U.P.C., this article offers insights regarding the purpose and effect
of some of the provisions of the U.P.C. No effort will be made to
compare the Code with existing Arkansas law; the Arkansas Bar
Committee and others who are knowledgeable about present Arkan-
sas statutes can provide the Arkansas details. Undoubtedly, there
are many points of similarity between present Arkansas statutes
and the U.P.C. because both are derived from the Model Probate
Code. 2 Both bodies of law have been demonstrated in operation .3 If
* Alston Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, Athens, Georgia; Educa-
tional Director, Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code; formerly Chief Reporter,
Uniform Probate Code Project, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
1. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (West 1977).
1.1. H.B. 169, 72d General Assembly (1979).
2. L. SIMES & P. BASYE, MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946).
3. The Uniform Probate Code was first enacted in Idaho where it became effective July
1, 1972. Subsequent enactments and effective dates are Alaska, Jan. 1, 1973; Arizona, Jan.
1, 1974; Colorado, July 1, 1974; Montana, July 1, 1975; North Dakota, July 1, 1975; Minne-
sota, Aug. 1, 1975; New Mexico, July 1, 1976; Nebraska, Jan. 1, 1977; and Utah, July 1, 1977.
The Code was enacted in South Dakota, originally to take effect, July 1, 1975. The effective
date was later postponed to Jan. 1, 1976, and the Code became effective briefly but was
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the Arkansas law is not producing results for consumers comparable
to those that have been achieved by the U.P.C. in other states, a
change is indicated. It is possible, of course, to patch up an existing
probate code with provisions borrowed from the U.P.C., but the
major articles of the Code covering inheritance, guardianship, joint
bank accounts and trusts are carefully coordinated both internally
and with definitions and supportive structural provisions in Articles
I and VIII. If any change of law is warranted, it should be accom-
plished by a complete replacement rather than a piece-meal adap-
tive process. The format and major organizational assumptions of
the U.P.C. should be accepted completely; changes to meet unbend-
ing Arkansas assumptions should be substituted when necessary.
The discussion in this article is limited to the U.P.C. treatment
of inheritance' rather than the U.P.C. provisions dealing with
guardianship,5 survivorship accounts,' trusts,' and other matters
which comprise approximately one-third of the Code. This selection
avoids an unduly long commentary and focuses on probate and
settlement of estates and inheritance where controversy most likely
exists.
The U.P.C. represents the beliefs that probate law should be
modernized and simplified and that the process of settling dece-
dents' estates should be made less costly and time consuming. The
discussion in Part I of issues arising from the U.P.C. coverage of the
substantive rules of intestate and testate succession relates to the
portion of the Code that promises most by way of modernization and
simplification of inheritance law. Part II, dealing with the U.P.C.
system for probating wills and settling estates, discusses points that
repealed in early 1976, with the repeal becoming effective July 1, 1976. See The UPC Defeat
in South Dakota, 17 U.P.C. NoTEs 3 (Oct. 1976). New probate codes bearing strong organiza-
tional resemblance to the U.P.C. have been enacted in Florida (FILA. STAT. ANN. §§ 131.005
et. seq. (West 1976)) and Hawaii (HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 560-1-101 et. seq. (1976)). Neither of
these enactments has been recognized by the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate
Code as an enactment of the Uniform Probate Code. The Florida Probate Code is discussed
in Fenn & Koren, The 1974 Florida Probate Code-A Marriage of Convenience, 27 U. FLA.
L. REV. 1, 615 (1974-75). See also Hawaii Is Not A UPC State, 17 U.P.C. NoTEs 2 (Oct. 1976).
For discussions of the variations in the first nine U.P.C. enactments, see Wellman & Gordon,
The Uniform Probate Code: Article III Analyzed in Relation to Changes in First Nine
Enactments, 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 477 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Article II Analyzed];
Wellman & Gordon, Uniformity in State Inheritance Laws: How UPC Article II Has Fared
in Nine Enactments, 1976 B.Y.U.L.R. 357 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Uniformity in
Inheritance].
4. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE arts. II, II, IV.
5. Id. art. V.
6. Id. art. VI.
7. Id. art. VII.
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are related to procedural costs and delays that have become synony-
mous with inheritance in the minds of millions of Americans. Part
III concludes the article and focuses on the future consideration of
the U.P.C. by the Arkansas General Assembly.
I. INHERITANCE
A. Intestate Succession
The proposals contained in Article II of the U.P.C. regarding
intestate succession are not likely to be particularly controversial.
The innovations of the Code here are few and well in line with most
perceptions about the proper content of the statutory scheme for
persons who fail to make their own estate plans.8 The circle of pro-
spective heirs contains no new faces; spouses, blood relatives (with
children and their descendants preferred over others), and adopted
persons, who would be heirs to those adopting them and persons
tracing kindred through them, constitute the potential takers.
Suggestions for inclusion of step-children, unrelated dependents,
and for variable shares for spouse and dependents, based on need
as determined by a court,'0 were rejected. Curiosities from ancient
sources and some prejudices still reflected in some current state
statutes also were rejected. For example, the Code draws no distinc-
tion between ancestral and other property, personal and real prop-
erty, and relationships based on whole and half-blooded connec-
tions. In addition, the time honored discrimination against recog-
nizing the connection between fathers and their illegitimate off-
spring was rejected. This happily occurred before the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision which invalidated this form of un-
equal statutory treatment of children as effectived by a typical in-
heritance statute."
8. See M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES, & 0. SMITH, THE METHOD, PROCESS, AND FREQUENCY OF
WEALTH TRANSMISSION AT DEATH (1970); a summary of previous surveys of the functioning of
probate law is contained in the SUSSMAN, CATES, & SMrrH book at 37-40. Dunham, The
Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241
(1963). See also Fellows, Simon, Snapp & Snapp, An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory
Estate Plan, 1976 U. ILL. L.J. 717 (1976).
9. Ohio law, for example, includes a provision for inheritance by step-children where
there are no blood kindred. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Page 1976).
10. English family maintenance legislation enables the courts to make "reasonable
provision for the maintenance of" certain dependents of a decedent out of the income or
principal of the decedents' estate. See Inheritance (Family Protection) Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo.
6, c. 45, as amended by Intestates' Estates Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 64; Family
Provision Act, 1966, c. 35; Family Law Reform Act, 1969, c. 46; Law Reform (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1970, c. 33, § 6(1). Family maintenace legislation is discussed in LeVan,
Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 TuL. L. Rav. 29 (1977).
11. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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In addition to the new posture on illegitimates, there are only
three important innovations to be found in the provisions of the
Code that govern intestate devolution. The first, and most impor-
tant, is a substantial increase in the spouse's share as against des-
cendants, parents, and other relatives. Reflecting studies that show
married people usually want all of their assets remaining at death
to pass to the surviving spouse,'" the Code gives a spouse the entire
intestate estate if there is no surviving issue or parent of the dece-
dent. The Code also allows the spouse to take a value of $50,000
when there is no issue by a prior marriage plus one-half of the
balance of the intestate estate as against issue if any, or as against
any surviving parent if no issue survives.":1 A spouse of a decedent
who is survived by issue of a prior marriage receives 50% of all of
the estate no matter how small or large; the other half goes to the
issue of the decedent.
The pattern of intestate devolution has proved popular with
legislatures, including several in states that thus far have failed to
adopt most other U.P.C. recommendations." States have differed,
however, on whether $50,000 is the right amount for the spouse's
100% step, possibly because U.P.C. drafters bracketed the figure in
the official text to indicate that the precise size of the step was left
to local option.' 5
The second principal innovation in this part of the Code is a
required five-day survival period for heirs, with the qualification
that survival for any moment of time is sufficient to qualify an heir
as against the state's residual right to take property when there are
12. SJSSMAN, CATES, & SMITH, supra note 8, ch. 13.
13. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102 [Share of the Spouse], which provides the follow-
ing:
The intestate share of the surviving spouse is:
(1) if there is no surviving issue or parent of the decedent, the entire
intestate estate;
(2) if there is no surviving issue but the decedent is survived by a parent
or parents, the first [$50,000], plus one-half of the balance of the intes-
tate estate;
(3) if there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the surviving
spouse also, the first [$50,000], plus one-half of the balance of the intes-
tate estate;
(4) if there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue of the
surviving spouse, one-half of the intestate estate.
14. Foi examples of legislation in non-U.P.C. states that give a surviving spouse priority
in a set value of intestate assets see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-12 (1978) ($50,000 if no issue
by a prior marriage); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Page 1976) ($30,000 or $10,000 priority
for surviving spouse, depending on whether the spouse is the natural or adoptive parent).
15. See Uniformity in Inheritance, supra note 3, at 366.
[Vol. 2:1
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no heirs.' 6 This provision derives from an effort by U.P.C. drafters
to offer a statutory estate plan that includes some protection against
problems related to quickly successive deaths. These problems in-
clude the need for multiple administrations before assets reach a
living owner and the unpopularity of distributions from estates of
deceased intestates to persons unrelated to the decedent who derive
their right from an heir who may have survived the intestate only
by a matter of minutes, hours, or a few days. The five-day period
of survival coincides with a five-day waiting period found in Article
III of the U.P.C. that must run before any but emergency moves to
probate a will or to open an administration may be acted upon by
probate court personnel." Every state legislature that has accepted
the U.P.C. formulations regarding intestate succession has agreed
with the wisdom of the survival requirement."
The third innovation deals with the infrequently encountered
tradition of permitting certain inter vivos gifts by an intestate to be
taken into account as advancements that alter the statutory scheme
of distribution of probate assets among heirs. Changing the tradi-
tional doctrine that raises a presumption of intention to advance
from the mere making of important capital gifts to heirs-apparent,
the Code requires that the intention to advance be proved by writ-
ten declaration of the decedent or written acknowledgment by the
recipient." The framers believed and hoped that this added formal-
16. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-104 [Requirement That Heir Survive Decedent For 120
Hours], which provides the following:
Any person who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is deemed to have
predeceased the decedent for purposes of homestead allowance, exempt property
and intestate succession, and the decedent's heirs are determined accordingly. If
the time of death of the decedent or of the person who would otherwise be an heir,
or the times of death of both, cannot be determined, and it cannot be established
that the person who would otherwise be an heir has survived the decedent by 120
hours, it is deemed that the person failed to survive for the required period. This
section is not to be applied where its application would result in a taking of intestate
estate by the state under Section 2-105.
17. The delay period, described as 120 hours rather than five days to avoid time zone
questions, appears in UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-302 (informal probate of will) and UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § 3-307(a) (informal appointment of executor or administrator).
18. See Uniformity in Inheritance, supra note 3, at 393. The indication in the table of
deviations that Colorado's version Of UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-104 varies substantially from
the Official Text is accurate but not relevant to the point made here.
19. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-110 [Advancements], which provides the following:
If a person dies intestate as to all his estate, property which he gave in his
lifetime to an heir is treated as an advancement against the latter's share of the
estate only if declared in a contemporaneous writing by the decedent or acknowl-
edged in writing by the heir to be an advancement. For this purpose the property
advanced is valued as of the time the heir came into possession or enjoyment of
the property or as of the time of death of the decedent, whichever first occurs. If
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ity would relieve fiduciaries of the burden of probing a decedent's
lifetime history of gifts to his children in order to be safe in distrib-
uting in compliance with the statute. Elimination of this kind of
unrealistic burden for personal representatives should mean that
the option offered by the procedural article of the Code to distribute
pursuant to or without protective court order will be used to avoid
court orders in routine cases.
B. Family Exemptions
Another major component of U.P.C. Article 1I, the family pro-
tection package,20 deviates from conventional patterns in order to
advance the overall purpose of the Code by increasing the efficiency
of the probate process. The most important part of this package
consists of three exemption provisions, two of which apply only
when the decedent left a spouse, minor, or dependent children.
These two exemptions consist of a $5,000 allowance in lieu of home-
stead and a variable allowance for support during administration
which may be set by the fiduciary as high as $6,000 without court
order.2 The third exemption, acting as a substitute for a hodge-
the recipient of the property fails to survive the decedent, the property is not taken
into account in computing the intestate share to be received by the recipient's issue,
unless the declaration or acknowledgment provides otherwise.
20. Id. art. II, pts. 2, 3, 4 constitute the bulk of the family protection package. The
definitions of "child," "exempt property," and "minor" contained in § 1-201, the 120 hour
survivorship requirement in § 2-104, and the definition of "spouse" in § 2-802 are also rele-
vant.
21. Id. § 2-401 [Homestead Allowance], which provides the following:
A surviving Spouse of a decedent who was domiciled in this state is entitled to
a homestead allowance of [$5,000]. If there is no surviving spouse, each minor
child and each dependent child of the decedent is entitled to a homestead allowance
amounting to [$5,000] divided by the number of minor and dependent children of
the decedent. The homestead allowance is exempt from and has priority over all
claims against the estate. Homestead allowance is in addition to any share passing
to the surviving spouse or minor or dependent child by the will of the decedent
unless otherwise provided, by intestate succession or by way of elective share.
22. Id. §§ 2-403, -404. Section 2-403 [Family Allowance] provides the following:
In addition to the right to homestead allowance and exempt property, if the
decedent was domiciled in this state, the surviving spouse and minor children
whom the decedent was obligated to support and children who were in fact being
supported by him are entitled to a reasonable allowance in money out of the estate
for their maintenance during the period of administration, which allowance may
not continue for longer than one year if the estate is inadequate to discharge allowed
claims. The allowance may be paid as a lump sum or in periodic installments. It is
payable to the surviving spouse, if living, for the use of the surviving spouse and
minor and dependent children; otherwise to the children, or persons having their
care and custody; but in case any minor child or dependent child is not living with
the surviving spouse, the allowance may be made partially to the child or his
1979] UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
podge of old statutes exempting certain kinds of household chattels
from probate administrations, gives $3,500 in chattel value or
money to the spouse, or if none, the surviving children without
regard for age and dependency."
The procedural provisions of the Code give the spouse priority
to administer when no executor is nominated,"4 enables appoint-
ment of a fiduciary to occur as soon as five days after death,2' confers
immediate distributive powers on an appointee" and enables a dis-
guardian or other person having his care and custody, and partially to the spouse,
as their needs may appear. The family allowance is exempt from and has priority
over all claims but not over the homestead allowance.
The family allowance is not chargeable against any benefit or share passing to
the surviving spouse or children by the will of the decedent unless otherwise pro-
vided, by intestate succession, or by way of elective share. The death of any person
entitled to family allowance terminates his right to allowances not yet paid.
Section 2-404 [Source, Determination and Documentation] provides the following:
If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised is not used to
satisfy rights to homestead and exempt property. Subject to this restriction, the
surviving spouse, the guardians of the minor children, or children who are adults
may select property of the estate as homestead allowance and exempt property. The
personal representative may make these selections if the surviving spouse, the
children or the guardians of the minor children are unable or fail to do so within a
reasonable time or if there are no guardians of the minor children. The personal
representative may execute an instrument or deed of distribution to establish the
ownership of property taken as homestead allowance or exempt property. He may
determine the family allowance in a lump sum not exceeding $6,000 or periodic
installments not exceeding $500 per month for one year, and may disburse funds
of the estate in payment of the family allowance and any part of the homestead
allowance payable in cash. The personal representative or any interested person
aggrieved by any selection, determination, payment, proposed payment, or failure
to act under this section may petition the Court for appropriate relief, which relief
may provide a family allowance larger or smaller than that which the personal
representative determined or could have determined.
23. Id. § 2-402 [Exempt Property], which provides the following:
In addition to the homestead allowance, the surviving spouse of a decedent who
was domiciled in this state is entitled from the estate to value not exceeding $3,500
in excess of any security interests therein in household furniture, automobiles,
furnishings, appliances and personal effects. If there is no surviving spouse, children
of the decedent are entitled jointly to the same value. If encumbered chattels are
selected and if the value in excess of security interests, plus that of other exempt
property, is less than $3,500, or if there is not $3,500 worth of exempt property in
the estate, the spouse or children are entitled to other assets of the estate, if any,
to the extent necessary to make up the $3,500 value. Rights to exempt property and
assets needed to make up a deficiency of exempt property have priority over all
claims against the estate, except that the right to any assets to make up a deficiency
of exempt property shall abate as necessary to permit prior payment of homestead
allowance and family allowance. These rights are in addition to any benefit or share
passing to the surviving spouse or children by the will of the decedent unless
otherwise provided, by intestate succession, or by way of elective share.
24. Id. § 3-203.
25. Id. § 3-307(a).
26. Id. § 3-701.
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tributee to sell a title that will be marketable for purchasers.2 7 In
concert with these provisions, the exemption package means that
estates of up to $14,500 in unencumbered values can be cleared of
all probate entanglements within a week after death where there is
a surviving spouse. If there are no additional assets, distributions
permitted under the exemption provisions will end matters. If the
estate is larger than allowable exemptions, immediate and safe par-
tial distribution is facilitated by the exemption package.
The same administrative profile applies when there is no spouse
and the heirs are minor or dependent children who also are entitled
to $14,500 in exemptions. Although minor heirs would need to be
represented in the appointment proceedings by a conservator or a
guardian, 28 the guardianship provisions of the Code make it possible
for the will of a surviving parent to appoint a testamentary guardian
for minor or incompetent children.29 Hence, it is entirely possible
that no additional complications will be encountered in clearing
small estates inherited by minor children.
From another perspective, the exemption package constitutes
a small restraint on testamentary power that makes it unimportant
whether a married person with a probate estate of $14,500 or less has
a will. Wills for such persons will continue to be important to cover
the possibilities of more assets at death than anticipated and of the
owner's survival of the spouse.
The exemption package also means that unmarried persons
whose children are fully independent adults lose testamentary con-
trol, as against surviving children, of household and other chattels
of up to $3,500 in unencumbered value. At first blush this qualifica-
tion might seem unjustified, but several considerations tend to sup-
port the provision. First, the actual disposition of household chattels
of moderate value is believed to be frequently handled by consent
among family survivors otherwise than directed by will. Second, the
statutory exemption does not prevent lifetime gifts of personal
items. Last, the exemption of modest amounts of chattel values
tends to facilitate administration of all estates by relieving fiduciar-
ies of responsibility for liquidating and accounting for the proceeds
of various household effects that are likely to be of more bother to
sell than they are worth. The statute, in effect, gives every estate
the administrative conveniences that follow where there is a will
containing a specific bequest of personal items to the spouse or
27. Id. §§ 3-711, -910.
28. Id. § 3-203.
29. Id. § 5-202.
[Vol. 2:1
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children. Wills can be simplified because the statute makes this
form of boilerplate unnecessary; persons without wills can be as-
sured that the statute treats them as well as if they were to make a
typical will. The chattel exemption provision thus aids in moving
the entire probate process much closer to the needs of persons in
average circumstances.
C. Pretermitted Spouses; Children
A remaining portion of the family protection package consists
of provisions protecting the spouse and children from being omitted
unintentionally by a decedent's will.30 By extending familiar legisla-
tive patterns in favor of "pretermitted children" to spouses, the
Code achieves protection against unintended disinheritance of a
spouse by a relatively simple procedure. The protection assumes the
conclusion that there was unintentional omission of one who mar-
ried the decedent after the execution of the will has occurred. The
result is that the law shrinks the effective control of the will to
whatever estate remains after allowing a share for the spouse equal
to a spouse's share in intestacy. If the spouse would be the sole heir,
30. Id. §§ 2-301, - 302. Section 2-301 [Omitted Spouse] provides the following:
(a) If a testator fails to provide by will for his surviving spouse who married
the testator after the execution of the will, the omitted spouse shall receive the same
share of the estate he would have received if the decedent left no will unless it
appears from the will that the omission was intentional or the testator provided for
the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of
a testamentary provision is shown by statements of the testator or from the amount
of the transfer or other evidence.
(b) In satisfying a share provided by this section, the devises made by the will
abate as provided in Section 3-902.
Section 2-302 [Pretermitted Children] provides the following:
(a) If a testator fails to provide in his will for any of his children born or
adopted after the execution of his will, the omitted child receives a share in the
estate equal in value to that which he would have received if the testator had died
intestate unless:
(1) it appears from the will that the omission was intentional;
(2) when the will was executed the testator had one or more chil-
dren and devised substantially all his estate to the other parent of the
omitted child; or
(3) the testator provided for the child by transfer outside the will
and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is
shown by statements of the testator or from the amount of the transfer
or other evidence.
(b) If at the time of execution of the will the testator fails to provide in his
will for a living child solely because he believes the child to be dead, the child
receives a share in the estate equal in value to that which he would have received
if the testator had died intestate.
(c) In satisfying a share provided by this section, the devises made by the will
abate as provided in Section 3-902.
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as where no descendant or parent survives, the will, of course, be-
comes ineffective save for nondispositive provisions such as the
naming of an executor. If the law is overlooked and the will is used
to control distribution, the estate will be distributed incorrectly,
and the fiduciary and distributees will incur liabilities which will
disappear in time as appropriate limitations periods run. :"
Some people may object to the kind of evidence required to
determine whether an "after-acquired" spouse was intentionally
omitted from a will. The test, according to the Code, is whether it
"appears from the will that the omission was intentional or the
testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside the will and the
intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is
shown by statements of the testator or from the amount of the
transfer or other evidence. 32 Arguably, this language leaves room
for debate in some easily imagined cases. On the other hand, the
number of troublesome cases should not be great. Instances in which
wills made before a marriage will show an intention to disinherit
persons who are then legal strangers to the testator will not be
common and should pose no problems when they arise. The remain-
ing cases involve testators who, following their marriage, fail to
change wills that take no account of the marriage. There should be
no question about the result in these cases except when the decedent
also "provided for his spouse by transfer outside the will." In con-
text, the word "transfer" plainly is used in the broad sense of any
form of settlement, whether by money payments to an insurance
company for a contract benefiting the spouse, or otherwise. Is the
outside benefit intended to be "in lieu of testamentary provisions?"
The size of the settlement, any statements by the testator, and any
other evidence may be considered. The results in a given case in this
category may not be easily predicted, but is there a better answer
to a hard case of this sort than to leave the matter to the judgment,
presumably sound, of a court charged with determining what a de-
cedent intended? Those affected by the question are free to resolve
the matter by settlement or to take their chances about what the
court will determine.
Protection against disinheritance through inadvertance is also
provided for children, but not for more remote descendants. :  The
primary focus of this provision is to avoid unintended disinheritance
of children who come into the family after the making of the will.
31. Id. § 3-1005, -1006.
32. Id. § 2-301(a); see the quoted text in note 30 supra.
33. Id. § 2-302; see the quoted text in note 30 supra.
[Vol. 2:1
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Where not precluded by express provision, after-acquired children
take as in intestacy unless one of two qualifications apply. First,
they will be excluded from an intestate portion if they have been
provided for by some nonprobate transfer and the testator has mani-
fested intention that the outside provision be in lieu of any share in
the probate estate. Second, an after-acquired child will be excluded
if the will devises substantially all of the estate to the other parent
of the omitted child and if other living children also were omitted
from the will.
Probably most wills prepared by lawyers for married persons of
child-bearing age now contain express language disinheriting after-
acquired children presumably because language of disinheritance is
necessary to protect the typical intention of married testators to give
the entire estate to the surviving spouse." The Code merely makes
express language of disinheritance unnecessary for married testators
who make wills in favor of the other spouse when they have one or
more children. Wills prepared by careful lawyers, however, will con-
tinue to have advantages for married testators who are childless at
the time of execution and for testators whose wills become subject
to the law of some non-U.P.C. state.
D. Spouse's Elective Share
The least important component of the U.P.C. family protection
package is likely to be the most controversial in pre-enactment de-
bate about the Code. The spouse's elective-share remedy as pro-
vided by the Coden' should prove to be unimportant in real life
principally because it guards against a calamity that almost never
occurs. The remedy is useful only when one spouse has deliberately
planned his estate so that there will be nothing, or relatively little,
for the surviving spouse and when this pattern of deliberate disin-
heritance is not supported by a written instrument signed by the
persons involved .3 The remedy will become a legal reality only when
a surviving spouse who has been disinherited without the use of a
planned writing moves within a relatively short period of time to
34. SUSSMAN, CATES, & SMITH, supra note 8, at 289.
35. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § § 2-201 to 207. For the text of these sections see Appendix
I infra.
36. The remedy provided by UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-301, quoted note 30 supra, for
cases of unintentional disinheritance of a spouse automatically takes precedence over an
elective share remedy because the latter includes account for all assets in the probate estate
to which the spouse is entitled by the terms of the will or by operation of law. Hence, a spouse
who has been unintentionally disinherited as provided in § 2-301 automatically has a mini-
mum interest in the distributable probate estate of one-half.
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start the lawsuit that is necessary to gain relief as authorized by the
Code. :7 Since most spouses do not seek to hurt their mates by disin-
heritance, '3 and since those few who attempt spousal disinheritance
probably know their partner well enough to be able to predict
whether omission or niggardly treatment will be tolerated or ac-
cepted, attacks on disinheritance attempts should be rare. Indeed,
no instances of litigation involving the elective-share remedy and
continuing to judgment have come to the attention of national mon-
itors to date. This observation has no pertinancy to the community
property states of Arizona, Idaho, and New Mexico that are in-
cluded in the first group of states to enact the Code, and no applica-
tion to Minnesota where the U.P.C. enactment omitted this rem-
edy.:" It is noteworthy that no serious case of spousal disinheritance
appears to have arisen to date under the Code as enacted in Alaska,
Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, or Utah. Cumula-
tively, the remedy has been on the statute books for 20 years in these
states.
In spite of demonstrated innocuousness, the elective-share rem-
edy will probably create controversial discussions about how it is
supposed to work. The statutory formula is complex; only the most
gifted can expect, on the first or second reading, to grasp the full
impact of the provision's seven sections. Section 2-202 is so long and
complicated that readers tend to liken it to highly unpopular provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code, an analogy that may halt rather
than further comprehension. Further, the emerging pattern is unfa-
miliar. Traditional statutory patterns providing elections for surviv-
ing spouses have concentrated on the probate estate and usually
have failed to charge the survivor with nonprobate values received
from the decedent. The U.P.C. scheme departs sharply from the
traditional approach on these and other points. The coverage of the
proposed statute is one about which almost everyone concerned has
some conception of what the law has provided or is supposed to
provide. It is not surprising that discussions of the elective share
often bog down.
Critics of the U.P.C. elective-share remedy usually pull back
when they are asked to come up with a simple solution to the multi-
faceted problem addressed by the Code. It is tempting to recom-
37. See § 2-205(a) in Appendix I infra.
38. See Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem,
33 U. Cm. L. REV. 681 (1966).
39. Minnesota statutes antedating enactment of the Uniform Probate Code include
provisions extending the remedy of disinherited spouse to certain nonprobate transfers. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 525.212, .216 (West 1975).
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mend, as a few have done,40 abolition of any forced share. The wis-
dom and political viability of such an approach can be seriously
questioned. Another simplistic solution is to perpetuate the tradi-
tional remedy that takes no account of nonprobate transfers. Will
substitutes, however, account for more than 50% of all assets pass-
ing at death from decedents in ordinary wealth ranges;4 therefore,
the old approach is patently lop-sided and more conducive to game
playing than to the ends of justice. The statute must become com-
plicated unless we are willing to enact a short statute that gives a
court power to re-order the distribution of all of a decedent's wealth
when a spouse petitions for relief from what he considers to be unfair
or unwise treatment by a decedent. This approach, tending to
achieve the objectives of the English Family Maintenance Act, has
some strong support in the United States,42 but U.P.C. drafters
concluded that the consensus of national legal thinking would not
accept a solution for the problem of spousal disinheritance that
conferred so much discretion on the judicial system.
In addition to complexities resulting from a formula that covers
nonprobate transfers, the U.P.C. remedy meets the following subor-
dinate objectives: (1) It takes account of both community and com-
mon law titles which, in this mobile society, frequently co-exist in
any given state.4 3 (2) It protects a decedent's estate plan by rejecting
the time-honored approach of election. Under the U.P.C., an
"electing" spouse may only seek more than the decedent's plan has
provided; thus, there is no "election" which involves the rejection
of decedent's plan in favor of a substitute provided by law. (3)
Working in concert with the U.P.C. system for probate of wills and
administration of estates, the remedy supports the objective of effe-
ciency in probate in several respects. First, neither the probate fidu-
40. See Chaffin, Protection of Surviving Spouse Against Disinheritance, 16 U.P.C.
NOTES 6 (July 1976).
41. See PALMER'S TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION (3d ed. R. Wellman, L. Waggoner, & 0.
Browder, Jr., 1978) at 13-14.
42. See, e.g., Levan supra note 10.
43. Note that "the value of the share of the surviving spouse resulting from rights in
community property in this or any other state formerly owned with the decedent," is included
in Uniform Probate Code § 2-202(2)(i) for purposes of charging the spouse with values already
received from the decedent. See also Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at
Death Act (1971) for another product of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws that attempts to coordinate community property and common law property
rights for elective share remedy purposes in a common law state. This uniform act and the
Uniform Probate Code are not duplicative or inconsistent; both should be enacted in every
common law jurisdiction. The Uniform Probate Code is designed for enactment by com-
munity property states; the Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act
is designed for enactment in community property states and common law property states.
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ciary nor the court has any initial responsibility to take action to
see that a spouse receives due protection; the remedy is activated
by the spouse's petition to the court. Second, land titles are not
clouded so far as the elective-share remedy is concerned because
there is no requirement that both spouses sign inter vivos transfers
of land belonging to either one; furthermore, land in an estate is not
made unmarketable by the possibility of election. The right of an
electing spouse relates to values in excess of those provided by the
decedent's estate plan; no lien on particular assets in the estate
results.44 (4) The remedy is coordinated to fit multistate estates. The
law of a U.P.C. state directs a spouse to the state of the decedent's
domicile for protection against disinheritance. 5 If the decedent was
domiciled in a U.P.C. state, the courts there are empowered to give
relief against recipients of the decedent's probate and nonprobate
assets wherever they may be situated. (5) The remedy is coordi-
nated with a simple device by which husbands and wives may ad-
just the property rights that would accrue at death by merely sign-
ing an instrument after fair disclosure; no consideration or impend-
ing marriage or dissolution is necessary. 6
E. Wills
A third major component of Article II's formulations regarding
44. A recently received report of the Maine Probate Law Revision Commission includes
the following comments about the U.P.C.'s elective-share remedy:
This augmented estate device has a number of advantages over more tradi-
tional attempts at spousal protection. (1) It prevents disinheritance more effec-
tively in the ways that intentional disinheritance is usually achieved, since, in
addition to the probate estate, it includes property transferred by inter vivos will-
substitutes. (2) It reduces problems of land title stability by excluding from the
elective share all bona fide transfers for value as well as transfers not characteriza-
ble as will-substitutes. (3) It prevents over-protection of the surviving spouse who
has been in fact adequately provided for by the decedent's inter vivos transfers or
insurance benefits, by including such amounts in the value from which the share
is determined and in the property that is counted toward making up the share to
which the surviving spouse is entitled. (4) Finally, the device protects valid estate
plans from disruption through election, by eliminating the over-protection referred
to above and by using the property devised to a spouse in making up the value of
the elective share.
The system thus has advantages for the surviving spouse, the estate planner,
the decedent who makes adequate provisions for the surviving spouse in the total
estate plan, and for title attorneys and others who are interested in the stability of
land titles.
MAINE PROBATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 109TH MAINE LEGISLATURE AND
SUMMARY OF THE COMMISSION'S STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING MAINE PROBATE LAW
(Oct. 1978) at 35-36 [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO THE 109TH MAINE LEGISLATURE].
45. See A Question About 2-201(b), 22 U.P.C. NOTES 8 (May 1978).
46. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-204 in Appendix I infra.
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the nonprocedural side of inheritance covers execution, revocation,
and construction of wills.47 Like the Code's provisions governing
intestate succession, the treatment of wills is much more conven-
tional than innovative. For states that have not recognized holo-
graphic wills, section 2-503 will be controversial principally because
lawyers have been trained to believe that holographic wills, usually
home-made and prepared without professional assistance, are a
great source of ambiguity. As a result, lawyers also believe these
wills have a tendency to fill the courts with litigation to distinguish
wills from notes, letters, and other writings that lack testamentary
intention and to translate amateurish expressions in conceded wills
into definite legal formulations. What lawyers usually fail to per-
ceive, possibly because of conflicting interests in the fees that come
from assisting persons with wills, is that the public plainly insists
on being permitted to use a "do-it-yourself" approach to will mak-
ing, as is permitted in virtually every other enterprise. Further, the
legal profession should note its relatively low status in polls showing
consumer confidence and respect for various professions and call-
ings. If there is concern for upgrading the image of the profession,
it may be beneficial to take a close look at rules that appear to force
the public to rely on lawyers. If holographic wills prove to be a
source of trouble and litigation, it will become obvious to the con-
suming public that lawyers have valuable training and experience
to offer prospective testators.
Another U.P.C. provision aids home-made wills that are not
handwritten and are therefore valid, if at all, only because wit-
nessed. The assistance comes in the form of section 2-505 which
provides that will witnesses who are also beneficiaries of the instru-
ments validated by their signatures neither forfeit benefits available
to them under the instrument nor lack capacity to be witnesses.
Most pre-U.P.C. statutes penalize beneficiary-witnesses by denying
them any benefit from the will. 8 In effect, these statutes create a
conclusive presumption that the witness involved is guilty of unduly
influencing the testator. Most will witnesses, however, are not aware
of the terms of the instruments they aid; therefore, it is patently
harsh to penalize beneficiary witnesses without concern for whether
they were aware of the provisions in their favor." The practical
impact of section 2-505 is on home-made wills because professional
draftsmen, who take great care to avoid any suggestion that a testa-
47. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE art. II, pts. 5, 6.
48. Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REV. 613, 625 (1960).
49. See Mechem, Why Not A Modern Will Act?, 33 IOWA L. REV. 501, 506-08 (1948).
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tor signed under pressure, routinely use only disinterested wit-
nesses.
Once the harshness and basis of the beneficiary-witness forfei-
ture statutes are understood, opposition to section 2-505 tends to
evaporate. The section does not condone undue influence of a testa-
tor; it merely equalizes the treatment of witness-beneficiaries and
all other will beneficiaries as far as undue influence is concerned.
All other features of the U.P.C. treatment of wills need not be
detailed here. For the most part, the drafters of the U.P.C. chose
will provisions from relatively standard statutes that reduced the
emphasis on form and thus increased the opportunity for courts to
find and effectuate a decedent's probable intention. The sections
permitting partial revocation by act and revival, if revival is in-
tended, 5° and preventing partial intestacy when one or more of sev-
eral persons named as residuary beneficiaries survive,5' plainly serve
these ends.
Section 2-513 of the U.P.C. validates will references to separate,
testamentary writings which fall short of meeting the formal re-
quirements for attested or holographic wills. The separate writing
may be prepared or changed after execution of the principal will.52
Restricted in effectiveness to dispositions of tangible personal prop-
erty other than money and property used in trade or business, sec-
tion 2-513 aids testators who persist in using informal notes and
memoranda to express wishes, usually frequently changed, about
disposition at death of valued, family heirlooms. The device also
helps lawyers who counsel testators in this category because it facili-
tates avoidance of long, detailed wills, and the correlative use of
frequent codicils, which usually cost law offices more than can be
covered by the fees charged without risk of losing a client.
A final comment is in order about two sections that have special
50. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-507, -509.
51. Id. § 2-606.
52. Id. § 2-513 [Separate Writing Identifying Bequest of Tangible Property], which
provides the following:
Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may
refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property
not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money, evidences of
indebtedness, documents of title, and securities, and property used in trade or
business. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposi-
tion, the writing must either be in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by
him and must describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The
writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's
death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered
by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing which has no signifi-
cance apart from its effect upon the dispositions made by the will.
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potential for reducing litigation construing the meaning of wills.
The provisions are section 2-602,'5 which enables a testator to select
the state laws that will govern the meaning and legal effect of his
will, and section 2-611,11 which relates the meaning of class gifts to
the Code's formulations about adoptions, births out of wedlock, and
relationships affected by successive marriages and half-blooded sib-
lings.
The choice of laws provision, which defers a testator's chosen
law only to local policy, should be held to control devises of land as
well as personalty. Local land may be governed by the law of an-
other state because the administrative system of the Code relieves
local title examiners of concern for the meaning of wills. Deeds of
distribution by personal representatives protect purchasers even
though the fiduciary involved may have erred in construing the
will." Thus wills for persons who have changed their domicile since
making their wills may be made far more secure in meaning than is
presently possible.
By aligning the meaning of class gifts and the personal relation-
ships defined by the Code for purposes of intestate succession, the
U.P.C. offers will draftsmen and construing fiduciaries relief from
problems that have generated a wealth of will construction litiga-
tion. Courts in states that have not adopted the Code or other simi-
larly comprehensive legislation dealing with class gifts affected by
adoption, illegitimacy, or half-blooded relatives will hopefully re-
spect the U.P.C. formulations in this troublesome area. They clearly
should do so when a testator has selected the U.P.C. to govern his
will and when a testator has defined a class term in accordance with
the Code as incorporated into his will by reference.
53. Id. § 2-602 [Choice of Law as to Meaning and Effect of Wills], which provides the
following:
The meaning and legal effect of a disposition in a will shall be determined by
the local law of a particular state selected by the testator in his instrument unless
the application of that law is contrary to the provisions relating to the elective share
described in Part 2 of this Article, the provisions relating to exempt property and
allowances described in Part 4 of this Article, or any other public policy of this State
otherwise applicable to the disposition.
54. Id. § 2-611 [Construction of Generic Terms to Accord with Relationships as Defined
for Intestate Succession], which provides the following:
Halfbloods, adopted persons, and persons born out of wedlock are included in
class gift terminology and terms of relationship in accordance with rules for deter-
mining relationships for purposes of intestate succession. [However, a person born
out of wedlock is not treated as the child of the father unless the person is openly
and notoriously so treated by the father.]
55. Id. § 3-910.
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II. PROBATE AND SETTLEMENT
A. Historical Perspective
The U.P.C. system for probate of wills and administration of
estates marks a progression beyond the assumption of the Model
Probate Code of the mid-1940's that estates should be opened, ad-
ministered, and closed in a single, continuous judicial proceeding."!
Stemming as it did from the efforts of academicians to evolve a
coherent pattern from America's hodge-podge of probate proce-
dures, the Model Probate Code accurately reflected and extended
an earlier trend toward increased use of conventional adjudicative
procedures to eliminate ghostly questions about missing wills or
heirs and to settle distributions and accounts of fiduciaries. The
U.P.C. drafters worked during a period of unparalleled consumer
criticism of probate delays and costs." The drafting also occurred
when increased use of a revocable trusts and other nonadjudicative
probate alternatives both demonstrated the efficiency of nonadjudi-
cative alternatives and confronted lawyers with doubts about the
durability of their ancient monopoly regarding the transmission of
wealth at death. Understandably, the drafters looked to history,
practice, and analogy for ways to make probate avoidance proce-
dures available to survivors of persons who failed to consider the
probate court's standard routine for settling inheritances.
B. Common Form Opening Procedures
The drafting committees experienced little difficulty in identi-
fying familiar efficient concepts. Common form procedures for ad-
mitting wills to probate and appointing estate fiduciaries evolved in
ecclesiastical courts in England and are available today in several
states in the eastern and southern regions of the country. These
procedures illustrate how administrative determinations can serve
as the basis for opening estates. 9 In contrast to the notice and op-
56. See L. SIMES & P. BASYE, supra note 2, at 9-19; Simes, The Administration of a
Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem, 43 MICH. L. REv. 675 (1945), reprinted in L. SIMES
& P. BASYE at 489-526, wherein Simes observes, "This series of steps in the administration of
a decedent's estate may be, and commonly is, for the purposes of determining the require-
ments of notice and a fair hearing, a single proceeding." Id. at 526.
57. See Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN.
L. REV. 453 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Blueprint]; Wellman, The New Uniform Probate
Code, 56 A.B.A.J. 636 (July 1970).
58. See Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoidance,
44 IND. L.J. 191 (1969).
59. Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 MICH. L. REV. 503, 505, 516 (1946).
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portunity for interested persons to be heard that due process de-
mands of judicial determinations, the administrative approach of
common form proceedings offers obvious advantages of speed. An
administrative determination of whether the decedent left a valid
will and of the other facts relevant to appointment of an estate
fiduciary, however, may be upset in an adjudication proceeding. It
nevertheless seems sensible to permit nonadjudicative opening pro-
cedures in cases where the risks of court challenge are remote.""
The procedures for probating wills and opening administrations
without adjudication are called "informal proceedings"', in the
U.P.C. "informal probate" tentatively establishes a will;""
"informal appointment" creates a "personal representative." :' Both
procedures are necessary to give authority to an executor named in
a will, but the two may be combined in a single petition and admin-
istrative response." In intestate cases, only "informal appointment"
is necessary to produce the opening of an estate by appointment of
an administrator. It should also be noted that the Code uses the
60. See REPORT TO THE 109TH MAINE LEGISLATURE, supra note 44, at 18. The Commission
stated,
Many of the benefits of this flexible system of administration will be realized
in the small or modest sized estates where there are no particular tax problems and
no controversies-the kind of estates that make up the vast majority of probate
administrations. Unless the successors or creditors themselves want it otherwise,
these estates can be handled much more expeditiously and inexpensively. Less time
will be required of the attorneys and of the courts and registers in performing much
of the routine paperwork and court appearances that are now performed with little
or no meaning in terms of its supposed protection of the decedent's successors and
creditors. In this sense, the bill is a measure to benefit the consumers of probate
services, the attorneys who work in the area, and the courts and court officials by
helping to conserve our judicial resources.
The Code proceeds on the assumption that the parties to a probate administra-
tion are as capable of performing their duties and looking after their own interests
as are the trustees and beneficiaries of inter vivos trusts. In most areas, the law
allows and requires persons to do these things without a theoretical, continuous
judicial proceeding requiring routine court appearances and adjudications in order
to supposedly watch over the interests of the persons involved and to constantly
guard against possible abuse or disregard of legal duties. This is certainly true in
the areas of contract enforcement and the law of trusts. Such a burdensome system
in the variety of areas where it might be imposed with as much justification as in
probate administration would be intolerably cumbersome and wasteful. So it is
today in probate administration.
61. UNIFFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(19) [General Definitions] provides, "'Informal
proceedings' mean those conducted without notice to interested persons by an officer of the
Court acting as a registrar for probate of a will or appointment of a personal representative."
62. Id. §§ 3-102, -301 to 306.
63. Id. §§ 3-103, -307 to 311.
64. See § 3-107 quoted note 66 infra.
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term "personal representative" to cover both executors and admin-
istrators .5
C. Independent Administration
The other major tool used by the U.P.C. drafters to permit
greater efficiency in estate settlements is an independent adminis-
tration. After appointment, a personal representative may proceed
as a statutory fiduciary to collect, settle, and distribute the dece-
dent's estate without having to make a report to, or receive an order
from, the appointing court. Thus, his administration may be inde-
pendent of probate court supervision.
The procedure is described by several sections of the U.P.C.
that prevent the probate court from retaining supervisory jurisdic-
tion following appointment, describe the general duty and authority
of personal representatives as noncourt fiduciaries, and protect this
status from retroactive vacation in cases of error. These sections
65. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(30) [General Definitions] provides, "'Personal
representative' includes executor, administrator, successor personal representative, special
administrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function under the law gov-
erning their status. 'General personal representative' excludes special administrator."
66. Under the U.P.C. all personal representatives are independent unless they are
"supervised." This is the meaning of §§ 3-501 to 505 and 3-107. Section 3-107 [Scope of
Proceedings; Proceedings Independent; Exception] provides,
Unless supervised administration as described in Part 5 is involved, (1) each
proceeding before the Court or Registrar is independent of any other proceeding
involving the same estate; (2) petitions for formal orders of the Court may combine
various requests for relief in a single proceeding if the orders sought may be finally
granted without delay. Except as required for proceedings which are particularly
described by other sections of this Article, no petition is defective because it fails
to embrace all matters which might then be the subject of a final order; (3) proceed-
ings for probate of wills or adjudications of no will may be combined with proceed-
ings for appointment of personal representatives; and (4) a proceeding for appoint-
ment of a personal representative is concluded by an order making or declining the
appointment.
67. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-107 blocks retained jurisdiction by a probate court; §
3-703, quoted note 88 infra, describes a personal representative; §§ 3-709 to 715 confer admin-
istrative powers; §§ 3-801 to 816 deal with creditors' claims; §§ 3-901 to 910 describe the
distributive process; § § 3-1003 to 1006 describe the process of closing without court order. See
also § 3-307, which provides as follows:
(a) Upon receipt of an application for informal appointment of a personal
representative other than a special administrator as provided in Section 3-614, if
at least 120 hours have elapsed since the decedent's death, the Registrar, after
making the findings required by Section 3-308, shall appoint the applicant subject
to qualification and acceptance; provided, that if the decedent was a non-resident,
the Registrar shall delay the order of appointment until 30 days have elapsed since
death unless the personal representative appointed at the decedent's domicile is the
applicant, or unless the decedent's will directs that his estate be subject to the laws
of this state.
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also confer wide administrative powers on personal representatives,
enable determination of valid claims without court order, and sup-
port nonadjudicated distributions and closings.
68
The potential contribution of independent administration to
efficiency in estate settlements is obvious. Estates can be collected,
distributed, and closed as soon as circumstances and paper work
permits. No papers in proper form for routine probate court filings
need to be prepared; no delays for court orders prior to paying
claims or distributing assets need to be tolerated. Time and money
can be saved.
Independent administration is not a probate novelty. An early
English executor who gained authority from a will probate in com-
mon form operated independently of the ecclesiastical authority
that gave life to the nominating will. In effect he was subject only
to the strictures of courts of law or chancery that might be invoked
by interested persons to complain about an administration. 9 In this
country, independent administration has been freely available in
varying degrees in Georgia, 0 Texas,7 and Washington" under wills
containing the right words, and in New Jersey and parts of Pennsyl-
(b) The status of personal representative and the powers and duties pertain-
ing to the office are fully established by informal appointment. An appointment,
and the office of personal representative created thereby, is subject to termination
as provided in sections 3-608 through 3-612, but is not subject to retroactive vaca-
tion.
68. See the sections cited note 67 supra.
69. L. SIMES & P. BASYE, supra note 2, at 386-95; 2 WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS 1263-65 (1st
Am. ed. 1832).
70. "A testator may by will dispense with the necessity of his executor's making inven-
tory or returns, provided the same does not work any injury to creditors or third persons, other
than legatees under the will." GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1414 (1975).
71. See Marschall, Independent Administration of Decedents' Estates, 33 TEX. L. REV.
95 (1954); Woodward, Independent Administration Under the New Texas Probate Code, 34
TEX. L. REV. 687 (1956). In Altgelt v. Mernitz, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 397, 83 S.W. 891 (1904),
the court stated,
While he takes charge of and administers the estate of his testator without action
of the county court in relation to the settlement of the estate, and may do; without
an order, every act which an executor administering an estate under the control of
the court may do with such order, he is uncontrolled, uninformed, unchecked and
untrammeled by orders of the court, directing, informing or commanding what he
shall do in the management and administration of the estate. He is an executor at
large, exercising his own judgment and discretion, acting and doing what he
pleases, unless brought to account for his actions by someone interested in the
estate ....
Id. at 401, 83 S.W. at 894. See also Saunders, A Texas View of Independent Administration
and Other Devices for Flexibility, 10 U.P.C. NOTES 3 (1974); 11 U.P.C. NOTES 3 (1975).
72. See Fletcher, Washington's Non-Intervention Executor-Starting Point for Probate
Simplification, 41 WASH. L. REV. 33 (1966).
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vania for executors and administrators in intestacy." For Pennsyl-
vania and New Jersey probate fiduciaries, as well as for their coun-
terparts in many other localities in the country, the absence of
watch-dog probate officials has led to customs that permit estates
to be closed without paper work for a public office. Closings occur
by private agreement and the simple process of distribution, receipt,
and release by devisees and heirs. Furthermore, in virtually all
states, executors of wills containing boilerplate language conferring
broad administrative powers enjoy independence from many pro-
bate court orders that remain necessary for administrators in intes-
tacy, although final accounts still must be filed and accepted by the
appointing court. 4
The principal challenge for the U.P.C. drafters was to provide
workable answers for those people in or concerned with the make-
believe world of title examiners whose worries about unbarred credi-
tors, unknown heirs, or devisees under wills not yet discovered fre-
quently translate into objections to titles derived through an estate
where all possible claims have not been extinguished by limitations
or adjudication. 5 The response evolved by the drafters rests on pur-
chaser protection concepts derived from the equitable doctrine of
bona fide purchase and the commercial law concept of negotiability.
Under the Code, a purchaser of land from an heir or a devisee is
secured in his acquisition by a piece of paper such as a deed of
distribution from a personal representative of his seller. By statute
the purchaser is relieved of inquiring into the probate court file to
determine whether potential will contestants or creditors have been
barred and whether the distribution was proper.76
Once it is understood that the statute enables an heir or devisee
to sell a better title than he has received, the title examiner's con-
cern should be reduced to questions about the validity of the stat-
ute, a matter that is discussed hereafter.77 There may be doubts,
however, about the utility of titles that are insecure for inheritors
73. See Straus, Is the Uniform Probate Code the Answer?, 111 TRUSTS & ESTATES 870
(Nov. 1972).
74. Illustratively, if it becomes necessary to sell land of a decedent during the course of
administration, and there is no power of sale conferred by will, it is necessary in practically
all non-U.P.C. states to obtain a court order for sale in a special proceeding for the purpose.
Wills conferring power of sale on executors make this sort of court order unnecessary in many
states, and so achieve a degree of independence for a probate administration that is denied
to intestate administrators.
75. See Wellman, Titles Under UPC, 13 U.P.C. NoTEs 4 (Sept. 1975).
76. The relevant provisions, contained in Appendix II infra, are §§ 1-201(10), 3-715(27),
-907 to 910.
77. See text at page 30 infra.
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although marketable in the hands of their purchasers. The insecur-
ity may be lessened by limitations that bar correction of distribu-
tions at the later of three years from death or one year from distribu-
tion,"8 but there remains possible beneficiary liability for the return
of an improperly distributed asset, or, if unavailable, the value
thereof, plus income."9 The drafters believed that most inheritors
would be willing to take the risk of ghosts in their own family in view
of the relatively short periods of limitations on proceedings to cor-
rect erroneous distributions built into the Code. For those people
desiring early certainty with respect to their right to retain distrib-
uted assets, the proposed law offers a variety of adjudicative proce-
dures that may be used to gain a timely resolution of doubts con-
cerning the identity of the true heirs or devisees. 0
D. Safeguards
When a U.P.C. neophyte has understood the Code's machinery
for making unadjudicated successions practical for estates involving
land, his concerns may shift to questions regarding the safety of the
system for all concerned .8 What protections are left for the lawful
inheritors when an unbonded personal representative with full
power of sale over estate assets comes into existence because of an
administrative act of a probate clerk of which they have no knowl-
edge or notice? What is the value of a lawful heir's right to land if
one who gains a deed of distribution thereto by mistake or fraud can
create a superior right in a purchaser? How are estate beneficiaries
to be protected from outlandish fees by personal representatives and
their hirelings, including attorneys, when compensation can be
taken from an estate without court order or statutory standard?
How can persons or corporations nominated to be estate fiduciaries
78. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-1006 [Limitations on Actions and Proceedings Against
Distributees], which provides the following:
Unless previously adjudicated in a formal testacy proceeding or in a proceeding
settling the accounts of a personal representative or otherwise barred, the claim of
any claimant to recover from a distributee who is liable to pay the claim, and the
right of any heir or devisee, or of a successor personal representative acting in their
behalf, to recover property improperly distributed or the value thereof from any
distributee is forever barred at the later of (1) three years after the decedent's death;
or (2) one year after the time of distribution thereof. This section does not bar an
action to recover property or value received as the result of fraud.
79. See L. SIMES & P. BASYE, supra note 2, at § 3-909.
80. The proceedings described by UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-1001, -1002, -401, -501,
and -105 provide varying degrees of protection from risks of erroneous distributions.




tolerate the risks associated with the laws governing fiduciary con-
duct unless they can be assured by an adjudication at the time of
distribution that there will be no dangling liabilities?
Answers to these and related questions have been woven into
the Code. For those people who are apprehensive about the likeli-
hood that irresponsible wastrels will gain appointment as personal
representatives through the Code's informal opening procedures,
there are several safeguards. These include (1) a mandatory five-day
waiting period after death before any but emergency appointments
will be made; 2 (2) an opportunity to use the delay period to file a
demand for notice and thereby prevent an appointment without
notice to the demandant;1 (3) a statutory requirement that the
appointing official shall first receive an application complying with
various informational requirements by one willing to accept the risk
of penalties for contempt and long-lasting civil liability for losses
resulting from any intentional misrepresentation;84 and (4) an op-
portunity to block an informal appointment and to suspend the
power of one already appointed without notice to interested persons
by initiating an adjudicative proceeding for appointment.,'
Perhaps the most important security against surprise appoint-
ments of unqualified persons comes from the section that describes
who is eligible for appointment." If there is a will naming an execu-
tor, the nominee has priority. If there is no will or effective nomina-
tion, the spouse can claim priority. In other cases, all heirs or all
devisees share priority, therefore, no one of them can qualify with-
out waivers or consents from the others. In effect, those people most
likely to be concerned and knowledgeable about the reliability of
anyone seeking appointment must be consulted and satisfied. These
same persons and major creditors may gain the additional security
of a bond securing the appointee's performance if they desire and
demand it; the same security is available when interested persons
distrust the executor selected by the testator or the decedent's
spouse. 7
The continuing fidelity of one gaining appointment is assured
by rules similar to those protecting beneficiaries of express trusts.
8
82. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-302, -307.
83. Id. at § 3-204.
84. Id. at §§ 3-301, 1-106 (quoted note 91 infra), -310.
85. Id. at § 3-401.
86. The relevant provision, contained in Appendix Il, is § 3-203.
87. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-603 to 605.
88. Id. § 3-703(a) [General Duties; Relation and Liability to Persons Interested in
Estate; Standing to Sue], which provides the following:
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If the risk of personal liability for mismanagement or erroneous
distribution is not a sufficient deterrent against fiduciary error or
defalcation to satisfy estate beneficiaries, the beneficiaries have the
option of moving the administration into the familiar format of
supervised administration .8 Furthermore, if a fiduciary is unwilling
to distribute without a protective order, a formal closing procedure
is freely available even though the opening and ensuing administra-
tion have been handled without prior adjudication. 0
Persons who remain unconvinced about these several safe-
guards tend to emphasize the risks to inheritors who fail to realize
that they have rights or fail to take steps that are adequate to
protect their interests. To be unprotected, inheritors whose connec-
tions to a decedent were so insubstantial that they did not learn of
his death, or, upon learning of it, failed to realize that they were
heirs or devisees, must also be beyond the knowledge of survivors
who seek to probate a will or to open an administration. This is true
because if those persons moving to perfect an inheritance intention-
ally conceal their awareness of other successors, those persons
wrongfully omitted gain a right to damages for fraud that is not
barred until three years after discovery.'
Other cases involving innocent omission of inheritors can be
divided into two categories. In one, there may be no known heirs.
In the second, the heirs may be minors or residents of a foreign
country who are patently handicapped and can not look after their
own interests. In either case, there may or may not be a will.
(a) A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standards
of care applicable to trustees as described by Section 7-302. A personal representa-
tive is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance
with the terms of any probated and effective will and this Code, and as expedi-
tiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate. He shall
use the authority conferred upon him by this Code, the terms of the will, if any,
and any order in proceedings to which he is party for the best interests of successors
to the estate.
89. Id. § 3-501.
90. Id. §§ 3-1001, -1002.
91. Id. § 1-106 [Effect of Fraud or Evasion], which provides the following:
Whenever fraud has been perpetrated in connection with any proceeding or in
any statement filed under this Code or if fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the
provisions or purposes of this Code, any person injured thereby may obtain appro-
priate relief against the perpetrator of the fraud or restitution from any person
(other than a bona fide purchaser) benefitting from the fraud, whether innocent or
not. Any proceeding must be commenced within 2 years after the discovery of the
fraud, but no proceeding may be brought against one not a perpetrator of the fraud
later than 5 years after the time of commission of the fraud. This section has no
bearing on remedies relating to fraud practiced on a decedent during his lifetime
which affects the succession of his estate.
19791
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Cases involving no known heirs should trigger procedures by
which the state may claim as ultimate heir. The Code does not
require notice to the state in these cases, but the probate court has
the discretion to permit or to refuse no-notice applications, and it
is predictable that this discretion will be exercised to assure notice
to the state in cases of possible "escheat."
2
Cases involving absent or incompetent heirs pose no perils ex-
cept where the nominee of a will or a decedent's spouse can qualify
as personal representative without the approval of all apparent suc-
cessors. 3 When the appointment of a nominated executor or spouse
imperils the interests of distant or incompetent successors, the court
may deny informal probate. 4 Whether the 'court will exercise its
discretionary authority will depend on whether those seeking an
informal appointment or probate have the approval of distant heirs
or include proper representatives of any minor inheritors. Once the
full array of possibilities is measured against the details of the Code,
very little risk for anyone remains.
Those persons who remain unsatisfied and insistent on proce-
dures that involve mandatory court protections against every con-
ceivable risk have two problems. First, they must demonstrate why
the vast majority of estates must be surrounded with mandatory
protections that are of utility only in very rare cases. Second, they
must show that the risks they apprehend are adequately offset by
protections available in probate procedures currently in use.
Plainly, it does not follow from the mandatory notices and adjudica-
tions which presently complicate conventional probate procedures
that no risk of error remains. The position of those persons who seek
to add more protective measures becomes untenable because the
present system has been classified by the public and most experts
as too cumbersome.
92. Id. §§ 3-305, -309. Section 3-305 [Informal Probate; Registrar Not Satisfied] pro-
vides the following:
If the Registrar is not satisfied that a will is entitled to be probated in informal
proceedings because of failure to meet the requirements of Sections 3-303 and 3-
304 or any other reason, he may decline the application. A declination of informal
probate is not an adjudication and does not preclude formal probate proceedings.
Section 3-309 [Informal Appointment Proceedings; Registrar Not Satisfied] provides the
following:
If the Registrar is not satisfied that a requested informal appointment of a
personal representative should be made because of failure to meet the requirements
of Section 3-307 and 3-308, or for any other reason, he may decline the application.
A declination of informal appointment is not an adjudication and does not preclude
appointment in formal proceedings.
93. See § 3-203 in Appendix III infra.
94. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-401.
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The other side of the debate seems more persuasive. The public
is massively disenchanted with the protections and attendant costs
of present probate procedures. This revulsion has been accompanied
by a widespread move toward some probate avoidance devices that
are inherently risky for all concerned. Is it not patently foolish for
lawmakers to listen to the judges and other persons who want cur-
rent protections and practices continued or made more complicated
in the name of avoiding risks to inheritors when, in reality, the
policy advocated by these Code critics has moved the real world of
transfers at death sharply toward probate avoidance schemes?
E. Limitations
There may be some objections to the Code's limitation periods.
One limitation period bars unsecured creditors of a decedent, in-
cluding those who are presently owed and those whose claims are
contingent or immature, unless the claims are presented within four
months after the first publication of the fiduciary's notice to credi-
tors. 5 The result may appear to deal harshly with persons who are
95. Id. § 3-803 [Limitations on Presentation of Claims], which provides the following:
(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the
decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision thereof, whether due
or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on
contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limita-
tions, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and
devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(1) within 4 months after the date of the first publication of notice
to creditors if notice is given in compliance with Section 3-801; provided,
claims barred by the non-claim statute at the decedent's domicile before
the first publication for claims in this state are also barred in this state.
(2) within [3] years after the decedent's death, if notice to credi-
tors has not been published.
(b) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death of
the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision thereof, whether
due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded
on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are barred against the estate, the personal
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as
follows:
(1) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative,
within four months after performance by the personal representative is
due;
(2) any other claim, within 4 months after it arises.
(c) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
(1) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien
upon property of the estate; or
(2) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding
to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for
which he is protected by liability insurance.
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unaware of a debtor's death or who assume that they are protected
as long as their rights to collect from another person have not fully
matured. Contingent claimants consisting of potential plaintiffs
who have rights against a decedent's estate because of his tort are
given relief against this bar which, in the worst imaginable cases,
may operate against claimants before they recover sufficiently from
personal injuries to know that they have a claim. The relief takes
the form of an exception to the nonclaim statute that permits late
recoveries of sums covered by liability insurance carried by the de-
cedent. 6 The harshness of the bar for other potential claimants is
the price of a statutory policy favoring expeditious settlement of
decedents' estates." In this connection, it should be noted that the
U.P.C. nonclaim period is longer than that to be found in some
nonuniform statutes. Furthermore, broad adoption of the U.P.C.
provisions relating to creditors of decedents may elevate a single
standard above the existing hodge-podge of variant nonclaim peri-
ods and provisions so that the rule becomes more widely publicized
and understood by everyone. If this occurs, it should increase the
ability of those persons dealing with prospective decedents to safe-
guard their interests. Alternatively, credit life insurance and prop-
erty and personal security interests that give protection against non-
claim statutes are freely available.
Another period of limitations, serving to bar probate of most
late-discovered wills, contests of wills probated in nonadjudicated
procedures (informal probate), and commencement of administra-
tion of estates not previously opened, runs when three years have
elapsed since the decedent's death.9 The Code is well within famil-
96. Id. (c)(2).
97. See Langrock, What Price Certainty, 6 TRIAL, Sept. 1970, at 20.
98. E.g., 3 months from date of first publication in Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.702
(West 1976); 90 days from first publication of notice in Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 147.040
(1973); 3 months from date of court order in Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 859.050 (West
1971).
99. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-108 [Probate, Testacy and Appointment Proceedings;
Ultimate Time Limit], which provides the following:
No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appoint-
ment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will previously probated at
the testator's domicile and appointment proceedings relating to an estate in which
there has been a prior appointment, may be commenced more than 3 years after
the decedent's death, except (1) if a previous proceeding was dismissed because of
doubt about the fact of the decedent's death, appropriate probate, appointment or
testacy proceedings may be maintained at any time thereafter upon a finding that
the decedent's death occurred prior to the initiation of the previous proceeding and
the applicant or petitioner has not delayed unduly in initiating the subsequent
proceeding; (2) appropriate probate, appointment or testacy proceedings may be
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Jar patterns as far as the possibility of probating late-discovered
wills is concerned, and much more considerate to late-blooming will
contestants than many existing statutes."' The feature of this limi-
tations provision that is most unusual when compared with existing
statutes is the bar on opening estates for administration. The bar is
included so that intestate estates, as well as testate estates under
wills that have been admitted to probate for muniment of title
purposes, may be settled by limitations when the period expires
before anyone moves to open the estate for administration."" An
alternative proceeding in the probate court is provided in the Code
to settle questions involving determinations of heirship and con-
struction of wills that cannot be resolved in the normal course of
administration once the bar applies.10 To the extent that recourse
to the alternative procedure is necessary and more expensive than
an unsupervised administration would be, the Code rewards and
therefore induces prompt settlement of estates. This combination of
limitations and optional procedures makes it possible for many in-
herited titles to estates to be made marketable without any estate
administration. It promotes the U.P.C. purpose of simplifying and
eliminating court-oriented procedures by sidestepping title prob-
lems that arise merely because administration may occur. The prin-
cipal inconvenience to be anticipated from this new approach is that
lawyers and title insurers will have to re-examine old learning about
clearing inherited titles. Costs will be incurred in the process, but
they will be nonrecurring.
F. Constitutionality of U.P. C.
If there have been serious constitutional challenges in court to
the U.P.C. as enacted to date, the news has not yet reached those
maintained in relation to the estate of an absent, disappeared or missing person
for whose estate a conservator has been appointed, at any time within three years
after the conservator becomes able to establish the death of the protected person;
and (3) a proceeding to contest an informally probated will and to secure appoint-
ment of the person with legal priority for appointment in the event the contest is
successful, may be commenced within the later of twelve months from the informal
probate or three years from the decedent's death. These limitations do not apply
to proceedings to construe probated wills or determine heirs of an intestate. In cases
under (1) or (2) above, the date on which a testacy or appointment proceeding is
properly commenced shall be deemed to be the date of the decedent's death for
purposes of other limitations provisions of this Code which relate to the date of
death.
100. See L. SIMES & P. BASYE, supra note 2, at 307.
101. See I UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL (2d ed. 1977), at 189-90.
102. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-105, -106.
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persons in national committees that attempt to monitor the legisla-
tion. Doubts about constitutionality in the minds of title insurers
and examiners, however, can generate impediments to the intended
functioning of the Code without involving litigation. If persons in
these service industries decide that the Code is, or may be, unconsti-
tutional in some respect that touches a title, the result will be the
refusal of their company or office to insure or pass titles based on
the statute. It's unlikely that these doubts will result in litigation
because those persons desiring the requested approval of a title will
simply go through whatever combination of procedures the title
examiners deem safe.
Hopefully title lawyers will read the statute and supporting
commentary with great care and, like the courts whose opinions
they must anticipate, give considerable weight to the legislative
judgment that the Code is valid and useful. The power wielded by
title insurers and examiners over the acceptability of various pro-
bate procedures is great, but it is not unlimited. Few title insurers
or examiners lack present or potential competition to the extent
that they would be unworried about the impact of purely arbitrary
judgments to refuse to go along with the title clearing devices built
into the Code. Most title lawyers should be keenly interested in the
experience of other U.P.C. states, as well as in the arguments that
support the validity of the Code's title clearance features.
Persons who examine the reaction of title lawyers in U.P.C.
states find that the news is favorable for those who want to simplify
the settling of inheritances. Except in portions of New Mexico and,
for a time at least, for persons electing to trade with certain title
companies in Arizona, title insurance appears to be readily avail-
able to prospective purchasers from distributees who receive land in
unadjudicated distributions, including those deriving their author-
ity from informal probate and appointment proceedings. Every
U.P.C. state's title specialists have had to adjust from past practice
which emphasized the insurability of title of heirs and devisees.
Under the U.P.C., heirs and devisees do not have insurable title
unless their distributions have been approved by, or received pur-
suant to, a formal closing proceeding.' 3 This form of proceeding is
a mandatory feature of supervised administration, but supervised
administration is not required to make a distributee's title insurable
since formal closing proceedings are available for ordinary adminis-
trations as well. 04 As noted earlier, however, an heir or devisee who
103. See Wellman, supra note 73.
104. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-1001, -1002.
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is unwilling to pay the cost of a formal closing procedure merely to
gain peace of mind about the risks of unknown and unbarred heirs
and devisees need not obtain a marketable title for himself as a
precondition to being able to tender a title that will be marketable
for a purchaser.
Title lawyers interested in technical arguments for and against
the Code's constitutionality should be aware of two recent and im-
portant state supreme court rulings concerning validity of no-notice
probate procedures. One involved a time-honored procedure avail-
able to Georgia widows for obtaining a year's support from a de-
ceased husband's estate. There is no statutory ceiling on the values
that can be transferred in this manner; °5 consequently, the proceed-
ing is frequently used to clean out probate estates of substantial
value. 06 Available both as an original proceeding and as a proceed-
ing following probate of any will and appointment of a fiduciary,
allowance of a year's support historically has not required notice
except by publication to interested persons. The court of probate,
following the receipt of report of special appraisers customarily
rounded up by the applicant for the purpose, merely orders the
recommended payment or transfer without further ado. The court's
order constitutes muniment of title to real or other property de-
scribed therein and the award has priority against the claims of
creditors, devisees, and heirs. Hence, the procedure produces a title
for the widow that prevails over the usual title snags attributable
to a probate succession, such as, unbarred claims, unprobated wills,
and unlocated or incompetent heirs.
In Allan v. Allan'07 the Georgia Supreme Court, in a ruling
expressly limited to cases arising thereafter, invalidated the year's
support statute as applied to unopened estates. The opinion con-
cluded that a binding order of a probate court made without notice
and an opportunity to be heard for interested persons was vulnera-
ble to constitutional challenge under the doctrine of Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 08 Anticipating that the holding
also might jeopardize two other Georgia probate institutions, com-
mon form probate and notice by publication to bar creditors, the
court expressly limited its ruling to binding court orders. Noting
105. The procedure, as amended effective July 11, 1977, to comply with the ruling of
the Georgia Supreme Court in Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 223 S.E.2d 445 (1976), is described
at GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1002 (1975).
106. The probate court order in Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 223 S.E.2d 445 (1976),
assigned assets having a fair market value of $45,000 to the widow.
107. 236 Ga. 199, 223 S.E.2d 445 (1976).
108. 339 U.S. 306 (1949).
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that neither common form probate nor publication to bar creditors
entailed conclusive barriers to persons jeopardized thereby, the
court indicated that neither was affected by its ruling. This position
was accompanied by express recognition that each proceeding, like
the year's support proceeding in suit, required no more than notice
by publication to interested persons, including those known to the
moving party to have adverse interests.
A recent case involving the Kansas nonclaim statute provides
further support for the proposition that Mullane notice require-
ments apply only to binding adjudications by a court. In Gano
Farms, Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno'09 a creditor that failed to learn of
its debtor's death in time to present its claim within six months
after first publication of notice to creditors challenged the constitu-
tionality of the statute on Mullane grounds. Distinguishing a notice
that merely starts a period of limitations by measuring the time
within which creditors may start or enter a judicial proceeding from
notices alerting one whose interests are assumed to be before a court
and are jeopardized by a ruling that might be made, the Kansas
Court of Appeals rejected the creditor's challenge. The court distin-
guished its ruling from an earlier Kansas Supreme Court holding
which required notice other than by publication to heirs known to
be jeopardized by a proceeding to probate a will. 110 The court rea-
soned that an heir, facing the prospect of a court order which would
establish conclusively that the decedent's will is valid and therefore
eliminate his chance of taking in intestacy, is entitled to notice as
required by Mullane. On the other hand, the creditor, who is ex-
cluded by a statute of limitations, is not entitled to the same notice
as is required for one jeopardized by the prospect of a court order
that will bind him.
Since Kansas statutes presently do not admit the possibility,
the court of appeals did not go on to indicate whether an heir simi-
larly could be precluded by limitations from contesting a will pre-
viously established in nonbinding proceedings. Its distinction be-
tween bars by statutes of limitation and bars by binding court or-
ders, like the distinction approved in the Allan case between bind-
ing and nonbinding court orders, suggests that a statute of limita-
tions might be enacted that would bar heirs and devisees who seek,
after a period of time, to initiate a court proceeding to establish
rights not previously brought before a court or adjudicated.
The validity of the U.P.C. provisions designed to settle inheri-
109. 582 P.2d 742 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978).
110. In re Estate of Barnes, 212 Kan. 502, 512 P.2d 387 (1973).
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tances after a time and without court adjudication rests on the
assumption that a state legislature may qualify rights arising from
inheritance in various ways that serve the public interest."' Rights
of heirs and devisees under the U.P.C. are expressly conditioned by
all of its provisions to facilitate prompt and efficient settlement of
estates."' One such provision gives personal representatives of dece-
dents administrative powers by which they may transform a dece-
dent's land or other assets into money or other exchange." 3 The
transformation may decrease the security an heir believes he should
have, but the Code plainly relegates the heir to the proceeds and any
rights he may have against an estate fiduciary; rights that would
arise, for example, if the will purported to require retention of the
land, or if the sale were improper for some other reason. Another
provision expediting estate settlements is the Code's limitations
period that cuts off rights, not previously terminated by adjudica-
tion, of devisees who fail to locate and secure probate of wills within
three years from death."' Furthermore, treating heirs as persons
that the decedent probably would have favored if he had thought
about making a will, the Code subjects heirs to a requirement of
initiating will contests within three years from the time of death,
subject to the right of a will proponent to seek an earlier court
adjudication that finally establishes his right to exclude the heirs. "
5
The right of distributees of a personal representative to create a
marketable title in a purchaser derives from another Code provision
designed to facilitate administration of estates."' Without it, the
Code's efforts to encourage administration and distribution of es-
tates without time consuming and expensive adjudications would be
111. See PALMER'S TRUSTS AND SUCCESSIONS, supra note 41, at 344-49.
112. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-101 [Devolution of Estate at Death; Restrictions],
which provides the following:
The power of a person to leave property by will, and the rights of creditors,
devisees, and heirs to his property are subject to the restrictions and limitations
contained in this Code to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates. Upon the
death of a person, his real and personal property devolves to the persons to whom
it is devised by his last will or to those indicated as substitutes for them in cases
involving lapse, renunciation, or other circumstances affecting the devolution of
testate estate, or in the absence of testamentary disposition, to his heirs, or to those
indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving renunciation or other circum-
stances affecting devolution of intestate estates, subject to homestead allowance,
exempt property and family allowance, to rights of creditors, elective share of the
surviving spouse, and to administration.
113. Id. § 3-715.
114. Id. § 3-108, quoted note 99 supra.
115. Id.
116. Id. § 3-910.
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an empty gesture for estates involving land.
It should also be noted that all limitations periods in the Code,
except for those designed to clear inheritances of claims of creditors
of decedents, commence at the death of the decedent. Heirs and
devisees have assurance under the Code that, though their expect-
ancies in particular assets may be shifted to sale proceeds and to
rights to surcharge fiduciaries or to secure refunds from persons
receiving erroneous distribution, they cannot be barred by limita-
tions without notice until three years after the death. Any earlier
bar will result from a judicial determination, and they must be
given notice of that determination in a manner best calculated to
reach their attention. It is of possible significance in litigation about
the constitutionality of the Code to note that heirs and devisees may
be fairly charged with notice of the death of a decedent under whom
they claim. As heirs, they are the nearest relatives; as devisees, it
is likely that they are close acquaintances or charitable objects who
have been informed by the decedent of his purpose to benefit them
by will and have therefore become attentive to his physical well-
being.
The Gano Farms case may also be of comfort to one who seeks
to uphold the Code's provisions designed to protect inheritors
against unknown creditors. As noted earlier, unsecured creditors
may be barred by limitations running four months from first publi-
cation by the personal representative. One might argue that such a
short period, running from a publication that may occur any time
between five days after death and a practical time limit more than
two and a half years later,"' is unduly harsh on creditors who argua-
bly lack the opportunity for news of a death that heirs and devisees
enjoy through family connection. If the resulting discrimination is
challenged on due process or equal protection grounds, Gano Farms
offers a useful answer; it holds that there are obvious and rational
grounds for legislative discrimination between heirs and unsecured
creditors of decedents. Little else needs to be said.
Inherited titles should continue to be marketable or insurable
in the hands of purchasers from personal representatives or distribu-
117. No notice by publication will occur before a personal representative is appointed
and informal appointment is not to be made until after 120 hours from death. Id. § 3-307. It
is unlikely that advertising for claims will occur later than two and a half years after death
because all creditors' claims are barred three years from death without publication. See § 3-
803(a)(2), quoted note 95 supra. Appointment in formal proceedings is not subject to the five
day from death delay period, but appointment in this manner involves notice, which may be




tees even if the four-months nonclaim provision is held to be ineffec-
tive to bar creditors of whom the personal representative was aware.
This is true because the Code contains a fall-back system to handle
unbarred creditors' claims; distributees are liable to the extent of
values received for unbarred claims."' This provision has no connec-
tion with the Code sections that are designed to protect purchasers
from estate fiduciaries and distributees. Presumably, this system
would remain intact for purposes of a claim saved from nonclaim
by constitutional considerations just as it plainly does for a claim
that remains unbarred because a personal representative failed to
start the short nonclaim period by advertising for claims.
The Code strikes a reasonable balance between the goals of
protecting everyone entitled to protection because of a decedent's
actual or presumed preference and of providing administrative con-
venience to all estate beneficiaries. There is no foreseeable, valid
reason to predict that its provisions which make inherited titles of
distributees marketable in the hands of purchasers will be held
invalid.
III. CONCLUSION
The Arkansas General Assembly should give great weight to the
study and recommendations of the Arkansas Uniform Probate Code
Study Commission concerning the Uniform Probate Code. This
group, made up of seven members of the General Assembly and ten
other distinguished Arkansans, including a law professor, a chancel-
lor, several prominent attorneys, and representatives of lay groups
interested in probate law reform, devoted several months of activity
and many hours in meetings to the question of how best to tune
Arkansas probate law to the needs of the times. For them, the Uni-
form Probate Code is the right formula; the General Assembly
should agree.
Arkansas legislators and lawyers may also be interested in the
gist of a voluminous and highly favorable report about the Uniform
Probate Code made by the Maine Probate Law Revision Commis-
sion. This body, created in 1973 by action of the Maine legislature,
worked in the grand tradition of New Englanders given to prefer
patient reflection to more dramatic modes of reacting to new pro-
posals. After five long years, the Maine Commission recently issued
a 662 page report of its deliberations and recommendations together
with a 51 page summary."' Like the Arkansas Commission, the
118. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-909, quoted in Appendix Ill infra.
119. See REPORT TO THE 109TH MAINE LEGISLATURE, supra note 44.
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Maine Commission recommended the Uniform Probate Code for
local enactment, virtually without change. The following excerpt
from the Summary Report from Maine provides powerful corrobora-
tion for the conclusions reached by the Arkansas Commission and
affirms, if affirmation is needed, that people in widely separated
parts of the country share a strong desire to reshape local probate
laws to meet the needs of families:
The Commission created by the Legislature of the State of
Maine was heavily made up of persons with extensive experience
in probate law. Eleven of the fifteen current members are lawyers
who are actively practicing or otherwise working in the probate
area, including the Chairman, Vice-chairman and Secretary-
Treasurer. In addition to the three active Probate Judges desig-
nated as consultants to the Commission, and who actively partici-
pated in the Commission's study and proceedings, three other
members have also served as Probate Judges in this State. Thus,
six of the fifteen current members of the Commission have had
experience as Maine Probate Judges. The interest of ordinary
working men and women and the public at large was also well
represented among the Commissioners. The working memoranda
of the Commission - well over 1,000 pages - were made available
over the course of the study to a special committee set up by the
Maine State Bar Association to follow the work of the Commission,
so that that committee could be fully informed of the work of the
Commission throughout.
Given the extensive probate law experience of the great major-
ity of the Commission members, one of the more instructive devel-
opments over the course of the Commission's study was a percepti-
ble change in attitude of the Commissioners from one of early
skepticism about the Uniform Probate Code to one of acceptance
and enthusiastic endosement. The Commission's proposed Maine
Probate Code is based overwhelmingly, after countless hours of
consideration and comparison, on the Uniform Probate Code.
Once the selection of the membership of the Commission had been
completed and its work was underway, two things became appar-
ent: (1) the Commission members were very much aware of the
need for probate reform and were anxious to accomplish it, but
they were also equally determined to accomplish it in a deliber-
ately thorough manner even if it meant that the original time
schedule established by the Legislature would need to be extended,
and (2) the probate reform experience of the past three or four
decades, culminating in the Uniform Probate Code, offered the
best means of achieving that reform and producing a comprehen-
sive and workable set of probate laws responsive to modern needs
and perceptions, logically organized and located essentially within
[Vol. 2:1
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one Title of the Maine Revised Statutes - a result which could
not be well achieved by approaching the task by amendments
made here and there throughout the various parts of the present
Maine law of probate.2 0
The Uniform Probate Code, now only a bit over nine years old,
already constitutes an increasingly well understood and widely
emulated proposal for unifying American probate law. Arkansas, a
state with a distinguished record for accepting uniform law recom-
mendations emanating from the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, should aid itself and the national
cause of probate law reform by enacting the Uniform Probate Code.
120. Id. at 5-6.
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APPENDIX I: Selected Provisions of the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
Section 2-201. [Right to Elective Share.]
(a) If a married person domiciled in this state dies, the surviv-
ing spouse has a right of election to take an elective share of one-
third of the augmented estate under the limitations and conditions
hereinafter stated.
(b) If a married person not domiciled in this state dies, the
right, if any, of the surviving spouse to take an elective share in
property in this state is governed by the law of the decedent's domi-
cile at death.
Section 2-202. [Augmented Estate.]
The augmented estate means the estate reduced by funeral and
administration expenses, homestead allowance, family allowances
and exemptions, and enforceable claims, to which is added the sum
of the following amounts:
(1) The value of property transferred to anyone other than a
bona fide purchaser by the decedent at any time during marriage,
to or for the benefit of any person other than the surviving spouse,
to the extent that the decedent did not receive adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth for the transfer, if the
transfer is of any of the following types:
(i) any transfer under which the decedent retained at the
time of his death the possession or enjoyment of, or right to
income from, the property;
(ii) any transfer to the extent that the decedent retained
at the time of his death a power, either alone or in conjunction
with any other person, to revoke or to consume, invade or dis-
pose of the principal for his own benefit;
(iii) any transfer whereby property is held at the time of
decedent's death by decedent and another with right of survi-
vorship;
(iv) any transfer made to a donee within two years of
death of the decedent to the extent that the aggregate transfers
to any one donee in either of the years exceed $3,000.00.
Any transfer is excluded if made with the written consent or
joinder of the surviving spouse. Property is valued as of the dece-
dent's death except that property given irrevocably to a donee dur-
ing lifetime of the decedent is valued as of the date the donee came
into possession or enjoyment if that occurs first. Nothing herein
shall cause to be included in the augmented estate any life insur-
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ance, accident insurance, joint annuity, or pension payable to a
person other than the surviving spouse.
(2) The value of property owned by the surviving spouse at
the decedent's death, plus the value of property transferred by the
spouse at any time during marriage to any person other than the
decedent which would have been includible in the spouse's aug-
mented estate if the surviving spouse had predeceased the decedent
to the extent the owned or transferred property is derived from the
decedent by any means other than testate or intestate succession
without a full consideration in money or money's worth. For pur-
poses of this paragraph:
(i) Property derived from the decedent includes, but is
not limited to, any beneficial interest of the surviving spouse
in a trust created by the decedent during his lifetime, any
property appointed to the spouse by the decedent's exercise of
a general or special power of appointment also exercisable in
favor of others than the spouse, any proceeds of insurance (in-
cluding accidental death benefits) on the life of the decedent
attributable to premiums paid by him, any lump sum immedi-
ately payable and the commuted value of the proceeds of annu-
ity contracts under which the decedent was the primary annui-
tant attributable to premiums paid by him, the commuted
value of amounts payable after the decedent's death under any
public or private pension, disability compensation, death bene-
fit or retirement plan, exclusive of the Federal Social Security
system, by reason of service performed or disabilities incurred
by the decedent, any property held at the time of decedent's
death by decedent and the surviving spouse with right of survi-
vorship, any property held by decedent and transferred by con-
tract to the surviving spouse by reason of the decedent's death
and the value of the share of the surviving spouse resulting
from rights in community property in this or any other state
formerly owned with the decedent. Premiums paid by the dece-
dent's employer, his partner, a partnership of which he was a
member, or his creditors, are deemed to have been paid by the
decedent.
(ii) Property owned by the spouse at the decedent's
death is valued as of the date of death. Property transferred by
the spouse is valued at the time the transfer became irrevoca-
ble, or at the decedent's death, whichever occurred first. In-
come earned by included property prior to the decedent's death
is not treated as property derived from the decedent.
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(iii) Property owned by the surviving spouse as of the
decedent's death, or previously transferred by the surviving
spouse, is presumed to have been derived from the decedent
except to the extent that the surviving spouse establishes that
it was derived from another source.
(3) For purposes of this section a bona fide purchaser is a
purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of any adverse
claim. Any recorded instrument on which a state documentary fee
is noted pursuant to [insert appropriate reference] is prima facie
evidence that the transfer described therein was made to a bona fide
purchaser.
Section 2-203. [Right of Election Personal to Surviving Spouse.]
The right of election of the surviving spouse may be exercised
only during his lifetime by him. In the case of a protected person,
the right of election may be exercised only by order of the court in
which protective proceedings as to his property are pending, after
finding that exercise is necessary to provide adequate support for
the protected person during his probable life expectancy.
Section 2-204. [Waiver of Right to Elect and of Other Rights.]
The right of election of a surviving spouse and the rights of the
surviving spouse to homestead allowance, exempt property and
family allowance, or any of them, may be waived, wholly or par-
tially, before or after marriage, by a written contract, agreement or
waiver signed by the party waiving after fair disclosure. Unless it
provides to the contrary, a waiver of "all rights" (or equivalent
language) in the property or estate of a present or prospective spouse
or a complete property settlement entered into after or in anticipa-
tion of separation or divorce is a waiver of all rights to elective share,
homestead allowance, exempt property and family allowance by
each spouse in the property of the other and a renunciation by each
of all benefits which would otherwise pass to him from the other by
intestate succession or by virtue of the provisions of any will exe-
cuted before the waiver or property settlement.
Section 2-205. [Proceeding for Elective Share; Time Limit.]
(a) The surviving spouse may elect to take his elective share
in the augmented estate by filing in the Court and mailing or deliv-
ering to the personal representative, if any, a petition for the elective
share within 9 months after the date of death, or within 6 months
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after the probate of the decedent's will, whichever limitation last
expires. However, that nonprobate transfers, described in Section 2-
202(1), shall not be included within the augmented estate for the
purpose of computing the elective share, if the petition is filed later
than 9 months after death.
The Court may extend the time for election as it sees fit for
cause shown by the surviving spouse before the time for election has
expired.
(b) The surviving spouse shall give notice of the time and
place set for hearing to persons interested in the estate and to the
distributees and recipients of portions of the augmented net estate
whose interests will be adversely affected by the taking of the elec-
tive share.
(c) The surviving spouse may withdraw his demand for an
elective share at any time before entry of a final determination by
the Court.
(d) After notice and hearing, the Court shall determine the
amount of the elective share and shall order its payment from the
assets of the augmented net estate or by contribution as appears
appropriate under Section 2-207. If it appears that a fund or prop-
erty included in the augmented net estate has not come into the
possession of the personal representative, or has been distributed by
the personal representative, the Court nevertheless shall fix the lia-
bility of any person who has any interest in the fund or property or
who has possession thereof, whether as trustee or otherwise. The
proceeding may be maintained against fewer 'than all persons
against whom relief could be sought, but no person is subject to
contribution in any greater amount than he would have been if relief
had been secured against all persons subject to contribution.
(e) The order or judgment of the Court may be enforced as
necessary in suit for contribution or payment in other courts of this
state or other jurisdictions.
Section 2-206. [Effect of Election on Benefits by Will or Statute. ]
A surviving spouse is entitled to homestead allowance, exempt
property, and family allowance, whether or not he elects to take an
elective share.
Section 2-207. [Charging Spouse With Gifts Received; Liability of
Others for Balance of Elective Share. I
(a) In the proceeding for an elective share, values included in
the augmented estate which pass or have passed to the surviving
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spouse, or which would have passed to the spouse but were ren-
ounced, are applied first to satisfy the elective share and to reduce
any contributions due from other recipients of transfers included in
the augmented estate. For purposes of this subsection, the electing
spouse's beneficial interest in any life estate or in any trust shall be
computed as if worth one-half of the total value of the property
subject to the life estate, or of the trust estate, unless higher or lower
values for these interests are established by proof.
(b) Remaining property of the augmented estate is so applied
that liability for the balance of the elective share of the surviving
spouse is equitably apportioned among the recipients of the aug-
mented estate in proportion to the value of their interests therein.
(c) Only original transferees from, or appointees of, the dece-
dent and their donees, to the extent the donees have the property
or its proceeds, are subject to the contribution to make up the elec-
tive share of the surviving spouse. A person liable to contribution
may choose to give up the property transferred to him or to pay its




APPENDIX II: Selected Provisions of the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
Section 1-201. [General Definitions.]
(10) "Distributee" means any person who has received property
of a decedent from his personal representative other than as creditor
or purchaser. A testamentary trustee is a distributee only to the
extent of distributed assets or increment thereto remaining in his
hands. A beneficiary of a testamentary trust to whom the trustee
has distributed property received from a personal representative is
a distributee of the personal representative. For purposes of this
provision, "testamentary trustee" includes a trustee to whom assets
are transferred by will, to the extent of the devised assets.
Section 3-715. [Transactions Authorized for Personal Repre-
sentatives; Exceptions. ]
Except as restricted or otherwise provided by the will or by an
order in a formal proceeding and subject to the priorities stated in
Section 3-902, a personal representative, acting reasonably for the
benefit of the interested persons, may properly:
(27) satisfy and settle claims and distribute the estate as pro-
vided in this Code.
Section 3-907. [Distribution in Kind; Evidence. ]
If distribution in kind is made, the personal representative shall
execute an instrument or deed of distribution assigning, transferring
or releasing the assets to the distributee as evidence of the distribu-
tee's title to the property.
Section 3-908. [Distribution; Right or Title of Distributee.]
Proof that a distributee has received an instrument or deed of
distribution of assets in kind, or payment in distribution, from a
personal representative, is conclusive evidence that the distributee
has succeeded to the interest of the estate in the distributed assets,
as against all persons interested in the estate, except that the per-
sonal representative may recover the assets or their value if the
distribution was improper.
Section 3-909. [Improper Distribution; Liability of Distributee.]
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned
because of adjudication, estoppel, or limitation, a distributee of
property improperly distributed or paid, or a claimant who was
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improperly paid, is liable to return the property improperly received
and its income since distribution if he has the property. If he does
not have the property, then he is liable to return the value as of the
date of disposition of the property improperly received and its in-
come and gain received by him.
Section 3-910. [Purchasers from Distributees Protected. ]
If property distributed in kind or a security interest therein is
acquired for value by a purchaser from or lender to a distributee who
has received an instrument or deed of distribution from the personal
representative, or is so acquired by a purchaser from or lender to a
transferee from such distributee, the purchaser or lender takes title
free of rights of any interested person in the estate and incurs no
personal liability to the estate, or to any interested person, whether
or not the distribution was proper or supported by court order or the
authority of the personal representative was terminated before exe-
cution of the instrument or deed. This section protects a purchaser
from or lender to a distributee who, as personal representative, has
executed a deed of distribution to himself, as well as a purchaser
from or lender to any other distributee or his transferee. To be
protected under this provision, a purchaser or lender need not in-
quire whether a personal representative acted properly in making
the distribution in kind, even if the personal representative and the
distributee are the same person, or whether the authority of the
personal representative had terminated before the distribution. Any
recorded instrument described in this section on which a state docu-
mentary fee is noted pursuant to [insert appropriate reference]
shall be prima facie evidence that such transfer was made for value.
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APPENDIX III: Selected Provision of the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
Section 3-203. [Priority Among Persons Seeking Appointment as
Personal Representative. I
(a) Whether the proceedings are formal or informal, persons
who are not disqualified have priority for appointment in the follow-
ing order:
(1) the person with priority as determined by a probated
will including a person nominated by a power conferred in a
will;
(2) the surviving spouse of the decedent who is a devisee
of the decedent;
(3) other devisees of the decedent;
(4) the surviving spouse of the decedent;
(5) other heirs of the decedent;
(6) 45 days after the death of the decedent, any creditor.
(b) An objection to an appointment can by made only in for-
mal proceedings. In case of objection the priorities stated in (a)
apply except that
(1) if the estate appears to be more than adequate to
meet exemptions and costs of administration but inadequate
to discharge anticipated unsecured claims, the Court, on peti-
tion of creditors, may appoint any qualified person;
(2) in case of objection to appointment of a person other
than one whose priority is determined by will by an heir or
devisee appearing to have a substantial interest in the estate,
the Court may appoint a person who is acceptable to heirs and
devisees whose interests in the estate appear to be worth in
total more than half of the probable distributable value, or, in
default of this accord any suitable person.
(c) A person entitled to letters under (2) through (5) of (a)
above, and a person aged [18] and over who would be entitled to
letters but for his age, may nominate a qualified person to act as
personal representative. Any person aged [18] and over may re-
nounce his right to nominate or to an appointment by appropriate
writing filed with the Court. When two or more persons share a
priority, those of them who do not renounce must concur in nomi-
nating another to act for them, or in applying for appointment.
(d) Conservators of the estates of protected persons, or if there
is no conservator, any guardian except a guardian ad litem of a
minor or incapacitated person, may exercise the same right to nomi-
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nate, to object to another's appointment, or to participate in deter-
mining the preference of a majority in interest of the heirs and
devisees that the protected person or ward would have if qualified
for appointment.
(e) Appointment of one who does not have priority, including
priority resulting from renunciation or nomination determined pur-
suant to this section, may be made only in formal proceedings.
Before appointing one without priority, the Court must determine
that those having priority, although given notice of the proceedings,
have failed to request appointment or to nominate another for ap-
pointment, and that administration is necessary.
(f) No person is qualified to serve as a personal representative
who is:
(1) under the age of [21];
(2) a person whom the Court finds unsuitable in formal
proceedings;
(g) A personal representative appointed by a court of the de-
cedent's domicile has priority over all other persons except where
the decedent's will nominates different persons to be personal repre-
sentative in this state and in the state of domicile. The domiciliary
personal representative may nominate another, who shall have the
same priority as the domiciliary personal representative.
(h) This section governs priority for appointment of a succes-
sor personal representative but does not apply to the selection of a
special administrator.
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